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The Evolution and Evaluation of 
Saudi Arabian Economic Planning 
Robert E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen 
Introduction 
Almost fifteen years ago the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
quoted the Qur'an in its annual report: "Verily, never will God 
change the condition of a people until they change it themselves." 
Throughout the first four Saudi Arabian development plans 
(1970-1990) themes of change and responsive participation have 
dominated the Kingdom's development philosophy: "strategic pri-
ority to structural change rather than to growth" and "the sponta-
neous response from sqciety . . . to the opportunities offered by 
development.''' 
In March 1985 the Fourth Development Plan ( 1985-1990) went 
into effect. At the time, King Fahd noted that: 
Fortunately, th~ changes in the oil market have occurred at a time 
when we have completed most of our major projects, while the rest 
are about to be completed, which will help us in bettering the quality 
of our output, which in turn will bring prosperity to the citizens ... 
What is going on in the oil market is practical evidence of the wise 
targets which have been determined by all of us in the development 
plans, in addition to the wise policies which we have followed in 
carrying out the economic and social goals. 2 
1. Howard Bowen-Jones, "The Third Saudi Arabian Five-Year Plan,'' The Arab 
Gulfjournal(October 1981), p. SS. 
2. Saudi Report (April 1, l 98S), p. 4. 
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Since the first Plan was introduced in 1970, the government has 
followed an overall policy to increase output so as to sustain the 
growth of employment and increase standards of living but at levels 
which will not create serious dislocation or social instability in the 
country. The Plans have outlined multifaceted approaches to the 
many problems endemic to a developing country. The focus has 
been to expand the national resource endowments of the country, 
to rectify shortages, and to spread the benefits growth throughout 
the economy. The recent economic growth in Saudi Arabia is 
undoubtedly due in a major way to successful government planning 
and subsequent intervention. 
The completion of the Third Plan in early 1985 and the initiation 
of an ambitious Fourth Plan in the wake of declining oil revenues 
and weakening OPEC solidarity is evidence that Saudi Arabia has 
reached a possible water-shed in its development efforts. This 
paper reviews the evolution of Saudi planning since 1970 and eval-
uates the country's unique approach to economic development. 
The Introduction of Economic Planning 
The public and private sectors each have separate but significant 
roles in the Saudi Arabian economy. Inasmuch, devlopment plan-
ning has been termed "perspective" for the former but only "indic-
ative" for the latter. 3 State planning has encouraged the growth of 
both sectors by allocating oil revenues to direct public domestic 
investment and by pointing the way for private investment. The 
government has thus become a traditional entrepreneur; undertak-
ing acitivites unattractive to the private sector for reasons such as 
large capital entry requirements. At the same time, the Plans have 
been supplemented by a variety of orthodox policy instruments 
(such as tax incentives and subsidies) to encourage as much private 
activity as possible. 
While informal economic planning had begun in the 1950's, it 
was King Faisal's foresight4 and persuasion which introduced eco-
3. For a description of this general type of economic system see Jahangir Amuze-
gar, Comparative Economics: National Priorities, Policies and Performance 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1981), Ch. 4. 
4. A fascinating account of King Faisal's insights into the country's development 
process is given in Savad Abdul-Salam Al-Farsy, "King Faisal and the First Five Year 
Development Plan," in Willard A. Beling, ed .• King Faisal and the Modernization 
of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, Co.: Wes1view Press, 1980), pp. 58-71. 
4 
nomic planning. An initial planning apparatus had been established 
in 1958 and formal planning began a year later when the Prime Min-
ister expanded the economic development committee. In 1961 this 
committee was replaced by the Supreme Planning Board which 
designed a development policy in cooperation with various minis-
iries. In 1965 this board was replaced by the Central Planning Orga-
nization (CPO) whose leader had close contact with the King.~ 
While economic policy prior to King Faisal had been primarily 
short run in nature, under his rule it was understood to cover the 
entire economic process over the long run. At the time, develop-
ment policy objectives in Saudi Arabia were to maintain religious 
and moral values, to raise the living standards of the people, to pro-
vide national security, and to maintain economic and social stabil-
ity. This was to be accomplished by increases in the growth of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), the development of human resources, 
the diversification of the economic base, and a reduction in the 
dependence on oil revenues.'· These objectives and means have not 
fundamentally changed since then. To carry the objectives out, the 
functions of the CPO (as defined in the Council of Ministers Resolu-
tion 430) were to: write periodic economic reports, formulate eco-
nomic and social development plans, estimate needed overall 
resources, aid other ministries, supply the King with technical 
advice, help establish planning units in other ministries, and moni-
tor and report on planned projects to the Council Ministers.' 
In the early 1970s, the CPO consisted of four departments: Plan-
ning, Research, Follow-Up, and General Administration.x On Octo-
ber 13, 1975, by Royal Order No. A-326, the CPO was elevated to 
the Ministry of Planning. By then, the country was prepared to effi-
ciently assimilate the vast increase in oil revenues. 
The First Development Plan: 1970-197 5 
In 1970, the CPO introduced the First Five Year Plan. 9 The targets 
of the plan, while perhaps modest by present standards, were to 
5. Yusif A. Sayiah, The Economics of the Arab World (New York: SI. Martin's Press. 
1978), pp. 177-78. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ramon Knaverhase, The Saudi Arabian Economy (New York: Praeger Pub-
lishers, 1975), pp. 316-20. 
8. Ibid. 
9. See Centr.11 Planning Organization. /Je11elopment Plan, 1390 A.H. (Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia: Central Planning Organiza1ion). 
5 
increase GDP and the available human resources so that the citizens 
would be able to contribute more efficiently to production and par-
ticipate fully in economic development. The plan emphasized the 
diversification of economic resources to prepare for the time when 
oil reserves became depleted. Revenue projections ranged from 
$8.12 billion to $9.0 billion. '0 Total outlays were estimated to be 
$9.94 billion-$5.5 billion for recurrent outlays and $4.44 billion 
for projects. Real GDP was estimated to grow at an average annual 
rate of9.8 percent. 
Actual revenues and expenditures were approximately $43.4 and 
$20.79 billion, respectively. Initially, the additional revenues were 
not incorporated directly into the domestic budget but adjustments 
to tbe budget have been made since then. The spending pattern 
adopted by the government for the surplus oil revenues was similar 
to that of an individual following a large windfall gain. 11 The large 
price and revenue increases and the close .knit family nature of the 
government suggests that an analysis similar to that for an individ-
ual can explain the government's behavior: individual estate plan-
ning rather than an adjustment to the consumption pattern. 
To be sure, without the existing planning framework, much of 
the new found wealth would have been spent on dubious consump-
tion and investment items. The existence of a long-run planning 
apparatus allowed the government to rank the many new alterna-
tives. In developing a long run strategy to allocate surplus revenues, 
four broad options were open to Saudi Arabian planners. 12 
The first was to invest in foreign assets. While lucrative in terms 
of potential return, the magnitude of the surplus could have led to 
an inflation of foreign assets. The prospect of a dollar devaluation, 
restrictions by Western governments on the type and amount of 
foreign assets purchased, and the potential confiscation of the 
investments, represented a real threat to this option. The purchase 
of foreign assets was also seen as an inefficient way to deal with the 
IO The average ( 1970-75) rate of exchange of USS I =SR 4. 16 was used. Calcu-
lated from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Year-
book: 1984 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1984). 
I I. Cf. Milton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function (Princeton: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958), and F. Modigliani, "The Life-Cycle 
Hypothesis of Saving, The Demand for Wealth and the Supply of Capital," Social 
Research(Summer 1966), pp. 160-217. 
12. Ibid. 
existing level of development and the problems associated with 
longer term development. While investments in foreign assets are 
relatively safe, some planners predicted results similar to a policy of 
economic imperialism-domestic resources exploited and earn-
ings invested overseas. The portion of the surplus invested in for-
eign assets became based both on the magnitude of the surplus and 
on the opportunity cost of the domestic options forgone. 
The second option was to provide massive amounts of unilateral 
or multilateral aid and/or soft loans. This option was difficult to 
defend given the primitive state of the donor country and the lack 
of managerial skill necessary to manage such a program.•.~ The third 
option was to increase government services-an attractive alterna-
tive to many who viewed it as the best way to redistribute income 
and raise living standards. The major problem however was the 
anticipated inflation in wages, real property values, rents, and 
locally produced raw materials. Also the government had rejected 
on phih'>sophical and religious grounds that it become an employer 
of last resort or develop a Kuwaiti-style welfare state. This would 
reduce productivity in the public sector and limit entrepreneurial 
incentives-ultimately damaging long term development pros-
pects. 
The final option for the government was to expand the physical 
stock of domestic capital on a massive scale. Domestic invest-
ment-as theory would suggest-would be the causal factor to ini-
tiate and sustain rapid growth. Unfortunately little attention'' had 
been given to situations such as Saudi Arabia where capital was 
abundant relative to labor. Most economic models at this time 
implied that self-sustaining growth could be attained by merely 
implementing an appropriate investment policy." 
Generally there are two types of capital investment for develop-
ment: social overhead capital (investment in non-direct facilities 
such as schools, hospitals, etc.) and directly productive capital 
(investment in direct support facilities such as transportation, com-
munications, utilities, etc.). These types of investment were viewed 
13. Hossein Askari and John Cummings, Oil, OECD and the Third World: A 
Vicious Triangle?(Austin, TX: Center for Middle East Studies, 1978), Appendix II. 
14. Jahangir Amuzegar, "Atypical Backwardness and Investment Criteria," 
Economica lnternazionale (August 1960). 
15. Hollis Cht:nery. "The Application of Investment Criteria," Quarter(v}ournal 
<if Economics (February 195.i ). p. 78. 
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by most economists inside and outside Saudi Ambia as suitable to 
create conditions necessary for direct private investment to flour-
ish."' 
Much discussion surrounding investment strategy centered on 
the respective merits of balanced versus unbalanced growth. Advo-
cates of the former strategy favored a policy of simultaneous invest-
ment in a large number of projects. Advocates of the latter 
suggested investment in only certain strategic sectors (particularly 
those having strong forward and backward linkages) and the 
sequencing of domestic investments over several decades. The 
most tempting option was to devote the great bulk of revenues into 
social overhead type projects. Although large sums of capital were 
exported and the government expanded its consumption, the pol-
icy adopted was one of unbalanced growth through social over-
head capital. The projects were attractive to the authorities: they 
used imported labor, raw materials and management, and in addi-
tion were highly visible and thus raised the prestige of the state. 
This option had its own limitations however. Investments in 
social overhead capital did not guarantee long term growth. Devel-
opment of excess capacity may not automatically induce invest-
ment in directly productive activities-especially in an economy 
with few entrepreneurs. A more fundamental criticism is that the 
investment program was not based on economic criteria but to cre-
ate a modern Islamic state. Syrians and Egyptians have pointed out 
that from an economic point of view, massive capital tranfers 
should have taken place to their countries where infrastructure, 
human resources, the industrial base, and local markets already 
existed. By not doing so, many countries of the region felt that 
Saudi Arabia had virtually wasted the only viable chance for suc-
cessful economic development in the reigon. 17 Clearly the Saudis 
decided to take a number of calculated risks when they released 
their Second Development Plan. 
The Second Development Plan: 197 5-1980 
In May 1975, the Second Development Plan was approved (Table 
1 ). The overall goal was to increase employment opportunities, to 
16. A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yak 
University Press, 1958), pp. 297-300. 
17. An excellent account of this issue is given in Malcom Kerr et. al., Inter Arab 
Conflict Contingencies and the Gap Between the Arab Rich and Poor (Santa 
Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1978), p. 14 
8 
Table I-Allocations by Major Programs, 
Second Five- Iear Plan 
Sector 
Water and Desalination 
Manufacturing and Minerals 
Education 
Health 
Social ProgramsNouth Welfare 
Roads, Ports and Railroads 
Civil Aviation and SAUDIA 
Municipalities 
Housing 
Other (Agriculture, Electricity, 
Telecommunications, Holy Cities, Other) 




Total Other Expenditures 


















SOURCE: Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan 1975-1980 (Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: Ministry of Planning, 1980), p. 530. 
raise standards of living, to diversify the sources of income, both 
domestic and foreign, and to reduce the country's dependence on 
imports. This was to be done by expanding the country's physical 
and social infrastructure. While the Plan was completed as oil reve-
nues were increasing, planners faced the constraint of increased 
inflation, a narrow resource base, little infrastructure, and an inade-
quate manpower supply. It was agreed that the Plan's success would 
~epend on successful completion of the following: massive invest-
ments in physical infrastructure, the preservation of hydrocarbon 
resources and increases in exports of energy intensive industries, 
an improvement and expansion of the government, increased pri-
vate sector participation, through diversification of the non-oil sec-
tor.'" The latter was to be accomplished through the use of foreign 
18. Ministry of Planning, Third Development Plan: 1980-1985 (Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: Ministry of Planning, 1980), Chapter I, Section 1.3.4.1., pp. 12-13. 
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labor, rural-urban migration, government assistance and the selec-
tive use of international cooperation agreements to obtain the new-
est technology. 
By and large, the main goals were met but not without some 
modification of the original investment targets. The major impedi-
ment to the Plan was inflation-in the last year of the First plan the 
cost of living index and the GDP deflator had increased by 34.S and 
25.6 percent, respectively. The following year the respective rates 
of inflation were 3 I. 7 and 40. I percent. During the entire Second 
Plan the cost of living averaged 8.8 percent growth while the GDP 
deflator averaged 12.2 percent. 19 The government was able to curb 
inflation since it identified the causes and subsequently introduced 
appropriate controls. 
The primary causes20 for this inflation were the increase in pur-
chasing power despite severe shortages, an inflationary monetary 
policy, excessively high fixed prices which had been written into 
many contracts, and imported inflation.J' Anti-inflationary strategy 
centered on eliminating supply constraints, increasing competi-
tion, increasing port capacity and efficiency, increasing the volume 
of available domestic assets (such as freehold land title), and dra-
matically improving internal transport and distribution systems. 
An appropriate monetary policy supported these measures. The 
annual expenditure budgets were consolidated at their I976/77 
nominal level of increase for the following two years with only a 
minimal increase for I978/79. Inflation was absorbed at the 
expense of some economic growth. An overall contribution of this 
monetary policy was a widespread reduction in expectations of 
sustained expansion "at all costs." 
In terms of macroeconomic targets, the actual GDP growth was 8 
percent-2 percent lower than planned (Table 2). This result was a 
conscious choice by planners, i.e. given the expected growth in 
absorptive capacity, activity in general could not be achieved with 
19, International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook: 
1984 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1985 ). 
20. Michael Keran and Ahmed Abdullah AlMalik, "Monetary Sources of Inflation 
in Saudi Arabia," in Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorothea H. El Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: 
Energy, Development Planning, and Industrialization (Lexington, Mass.: Lex-
ington Books, 1982), pp. 113-152. 
21. Ragaei El Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 194. 
IO 
inflation and fluctuations in the growth rate. Thus, the first year of 
the Second Plan was the peak growth year with deceleration in 
both growth and inflation from then on. Despite a shortfall in over-
all growth of 2 percent, the growth rate of IS. I percent was 
achieved in the non-oil sector against a projected rate of I 3. 3. 
Diversification from oil-a major objective of the Plan-was 
attained; the share of the non-oil sector increased from 27 percent 
of GDP to 39 percent during the period. 22 
Table 2-Second Five Thar Plan, Planned 
and Actual Annual Growth Rates 
Planned 













Non-Oil Economy 13.3 
Oil Sectors 9.7 















SOURCE: Ministry of Planning, Tbe Second Development Plan 1975-1980 (Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: Ministry of Planning, 1980). p. 28. 
As noted above, the scope of the Second Plan required a substan-
tial increase in manpower. The civilian labor force grew at an esti-
mated average of 7.2 percent over the period compared to 3.8 
percent during the First Plan. At the same time the proportion of 
Saudi nationals in the work force declined from 72 percent in I975 
to 5 7 percent in I 980 as a result of more foreign nationals in Saudi 
22. Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan: 1975-1980 (Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia: Ministry of Planning, 1980). 
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Arabia and a significant drop in the participation rate of males I 2 to 
19 years of age (now enrolled in government training programs). 
Furthermore, a significant proportion of the labor force found it 
attractive to retire earlier. In summary, the Second Plan saw consid-
erable progress in the country. Favorable growth rates were 
obtained, inflation was reduced, absorptive capacity increased, 
and infrastructure improved-all in a period of relative social stabil-
ity. 
The Third Development Plan: 1980-1985 
While the Second Plan had eliminated some of the more severe 
problems other problems such as efficiency and participation 
remained. The overall goal of the Third Plan was to diversify the 
economic base in the Kingdom. Specific goals of the Plan were high 
growth in selected areas, reducing the size of the foreign work 
force, increasing the efficiency of labor and industry, price stabili-
zation, increasing investment, moderating interest rates, providing 
an adequate supply of liquidity, and providing a predictable Riyal 
exchange rate. Three medium range objectives were identified: the 
structural change of the economy, increased participation in eco-
nomic development, and great economic and administrative effi-
ciency. With regard to structural changes, the policy was to expand 
oil and gas production, agriculture, mining and industry, and to 
continue to develop infrastructure. Clearly economic diversifica-
tion required development of these sectors. In the government's 
view, the private sector was to be ultimately responsible for the bulk 
of output in these sectors. Thus the government continued to envi-
sion itself as a catalyst to provide information, research results, and 
necessary financial and investment incentives. The goal of the 
Third Plan and beyond was to reduce the government share of GDP. 
Like its predecessor, the Third Plan anticipated a vast 
expenditure-$235 billion not including defense or foreign aid. 
When compared to the Second Plan, several shifts in development 
expenditures became evident (Table 3 ). For example, the share allo-
cated to infrastructure development declined from 40 percent to 32 
percent, while the share going to productive activities (such as 
industry and mining) increased from 21 percent to 33 percent. 
Human resource development showed a modest increase. In short 
the Plan was to be a period of consolidation with a more selective 
approach to growth and some form of manpower constraint. 
12 
Excessive inflation was acknowledged in the Plan as an area of 
major concern. Subsection 3.5 of the "Strategy for the Third Plan" 
listed the major inflationary forces which were considered as obsta-
cles to development. 2·1 These were the existence of a gap between 
government financed demand and the supply of goods and ser-
vices, the steep rise in government expenditures, the shortage of 
skilled manpower, the demand buildup in the private sector, and 
the existence of imported inflation. 
The major strategy in the Plan was to rapidly increase productiv-
ity. This expected increase in productivity would translate into 
550,000 fewer workers needed in the economy. As noted above, 
since the participation rate of Saudi nationals had declined slightly, 
the lack of any increase in productivity would have meant a signifi-
cant increase in imported labor. 24 Capital and skill-intensive 
· improvements within each specific sector. 
Table 3-Government Expenditures on Development, 
Second and Third Plans 
Second Plan Third Plan 
Function (Percent) (Percent) 
Economic Resource Development 20.5 33.4 
Human Resource Development 13.0 16.6 
Social Development 7.6 7.8 
Physical Infrastructure 40.4 31.8 
Subtotal: Development 81.5 89.6 
Administration 5.5 4.0 
Emergency Reserves, Subsidies 13.0 6.4 
TOTAL CIVILIAN EXPENDITURE 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: Ministry of Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Third Development Plan 
(Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Ministry of Planning, 1980), p. 20. 
The Feasibility of the Third Plan. The goals of the Third Plan 
were to stabilize prices, to increase the growth rate of the non-oil 
sector, to increase private investment, to moderate interest rates, to 
23. Bowen-Jones, "Third Five-Year Plan," p.57. 
24. Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorothea H. El Mallakh, "The Third Development Plan 
of Saudi Arabia, 1400-1405 A.H. 1980-1985 A. D ." in El Mallakh and El Mallakh 
Saudi Arabia: Energy, pp. 187-88. ' 
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provide an adequate supply of liquidity, and to provide predictable 
riyal exchange r.ue. A serious issue is whether or not the Third Plan 
is feasible. For example, there is a marked lack of any over-all analy-
sis on the Plan's goals. Trade-offs are not discussed, and there is 
little discussion on the use of macroeconomic policy instruments 
to achieve the targets. Perhaps the most important issue facing the 
country is whether or not local policy makers have adequate fiscal 
and monetary tools to implement the plan and consequently attain 
the stated goals. 
The.fiscal balance for example has been heavily influenced by the 
five year spending targets. While these targets did not allow for 
conventional fine tuning, the way in which funds are disbursed in 
Saudi Arabia nevertheless acts as a short term regulatory valve on 
the private sector. Since 1970, the Finance Ministry has imposed 
strict controls over funds' allocation to departments. Delaying pay-
ments has helped to prevent over-stimulation. In addition, the gov-
ernment has shown a willingness in the past to cut spending to stop 
inflation and presumably this could be done again in the future if 
necessary. Another unique feature of the economy is the negligible 
taxation. Any suggestion of raising taxes would likely be very 
unpopular. 25 
Constraints on using fiscal instruments has placed a greater bur-
den on monetary policy. Again, few traditional instruments are 
available. The government does not issue debt instruments since 
there is no need to borrow to finance government spending. 2" In 
addition, the law forbids any interest payment. Thus the Saudi Ara-
bian Monetary Authority (SAMA) cannot use open market opera-
tions to drain liquidity from the banking system or rediscount 
paper at high interest rates to control bank lending. Consequently 
two of the most widely used monetary tools are not used in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Based on these considerations it was not clear whether the gov-
ernment could in fact contain inflation while providing enough pri-
vate sector credit for expansion according to the Plan. To test the 
feasibility of the Third Plan, a large scale macroeconomic model of 
25. William Quaindt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 42 
26. Ragaei El Mallakh, Rush to Development, pp. 223-225. 
14 
the Saudi Arabian economy was developed.'" The model is based on 
four major assumptions: ( 1) a limited number of exogenous varia-
bles determine the macroeconomic variables, (2) government 
expenditures follow a pattern similar to that of 1960-79, (3) no 
major alterations in world economic conditions would take place 
over the Plan period, and (4) the oil glut would continue at least 
until r 1985. 
Utilizing this model, simulations were designed to test for the 
consistency of Third Plan's major objectives. Real government 
investment was selected as the instrument variable in each simula-
tion. This assumes that the authorities will have more·control over 
capital than over current expenditures (such as salaries). For pur-
poses of the simulations, the major economic objectives of the 
Third Plan were dichotomized into (a) a growth objective where 
·real non-oil GDP, increases at a minimum acceptable rate of 6. 19 
percent annually, (b) a social objective where the labor forces 
increases at a maximum rate of 1. 16 percent annually, ( c) a stability 
objective where inflation is less than IO percent, and (d) an ideolog-
ical objective where the private sector gradually replaces the gov-
ernment sector. While no actual target has been announced by the 
Saudi government, for simulation purposes it was assumed that a 
one to one proportion between private and government expendi-
ture would exist. 
Simulation Results. The first set of simulations assumed that 
the authorities would implement a strategy to reduce the foreign 
work force-an average annual growth of only 1.16 in the labor 
force would be strictly adhered to. The simulated growth path 
(Table 4) illustrate several fundamental tradeoffs likely to confront 
Saudi planners over the Third and into the Fourth Plan (1985-1990) 
periods. These are: 
I. High growth (6.19 percent above), price stability (inflation 
under 10 percent), increased private sector participation, and a 
reduction in the foreign labor force are incompatible objectives. 
2. ·Real income growth in the target range (6.19 percent) cannot 
27. An earlier version of the model was presented in Robert E. Looney "Saudi 
Arabia's Economic Development Strategy: Alternative Crude Oil Production Sce-
narios," NUPI NOTAT No. 203, Oslo, Norway, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk lnstitut, 
1980. A fuJI description of the model is given in Robert E. Looney, "Impact of the 
World Oil Glut on the Saudi Arabian Five Year Plan ( 1980-85 )," Paper presented at 
the 1983 Middle East Studies Association Meetings, Chicago, November 1983. 
15 
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be suscained wichout double digit inflacion (Paths I, II and IV). 
3. An increase in che relative share of private sector expenditures 
will lead to a reduction in real non-oil GDP (Paths III and IV). 
4. Inflation can be constrained at moderate rates only at the cost 
of reduced income growth paths (Paths III and IV). 
The best compromise among policy objectives appears to be one 
( 
of moderate growth-non-oil income expansion in the 5 percent 
range under conditions of minimum inflation (see Path V). This 
path would assure real income increases, price stability, meet the 
foreign labor force objectives, and increase the participation of the 
private sector. 
These results are both disturbing and encouraging. On the one 
hand, it is clear that the Kingdom cannot achieve the objectives of 
the Third Plan without fundamental structural changes in the econ-
omy. Increasing the amount of money allocated to infrastructure 
and related projects will not automatically assure attainment of the 
stated goals. On the other hand, the picture could change drasti-
cally if the authorities modify their policy on foreign workers. This 
hypothesis was tested through a series of additional simulations. If 
the labor force was allowed to expand beyond the target of 1. 16 
percent to approximately 5.0 percent the inflationary pressure 
would decline. Real growth and inflation would be approximtely 6 
percent and 8 percent respectively, with some gradual increase in 
private sector participation. Growth rates over 8 percent are clearly 
undesirable under any reasonable foreign labor policy-expansion 
at this rate would lead to unacceptable inflation. 
In general these results were supported by other simulations18 
which identified the maximum non-oil GDP growth rates attainable 
under alternative inflationary constraints. Rates of growth in the 
6-7 percent range may be possible at the expense of relative private 
sector expansion, and significant expansion of the private sector 
can only occur with reduced overall growth. Specifically, with 
regard to the private sector, an expansion would be facilitated by 
higher labor force growth rates, but any significant increase could 
only be obtained at the expense of over-all income growth. 
The model indicates there were no unique bounds to Saudi Ara-
bia's growth path during the Third Plan. The growth path selected 
would implicitly be at the expense of one of the Plan's major priori-
28. Available from authors on request. 
17 
ties. While the results of the Plan have not yet been published, it is 
clear that the recent reduction in oil revenues has not resulted in a 
proportional reduction in government allocations. Instead the gov-
ernment has been willing to reduce part of its foreign portfolio to 
make up for the loss in revenues in 1982 and 1983. 29 This reflects a 
determination to continue to disperse the wealth to the population 
and to maintain existing levels of prosperity where possible. The 
slowdown in public expenditures did affect the economy to some 
degree. Estimates are that real GDP fell by more than 17 percent in 
1983, although the majority of the reduction was in the oil sector. 
Real non-oil GDP grew at probably around 2.5 percent which 
although well below the double digit averages of the mid 1970's 
was nevertheless impressive. 
The Fourth Development Plan: 1985-1990 
The Fourth Plan was released in Ma;ch 1985. As our model indi-
cated, many of the government's macroeconomic targets could not 
be met by the end of the Third Plan. Many of the targets have been 
extended into the Fourth Plan period. The main objectives of the 
latest plan are to streamline the administration and reduce or even 
eliminate unnecessary support and subsidy programs. Total govern-
ment expenditures for the plan are $277.7 billion with approxi-
mately fifty percent allocated to development projects. 
The Fourth Plan is based upon four principal themes, each aimed 
at addressing the Kingdom's long term challenges. First, there is a 
heightened concern with the operational efficiency of the King-
dom's resources and facilities. Secondly, the Plan focuses on the 
diversification of production activities, especially in areas such as 
manufacturing, agriculture and finance. The annual growth rate of 
GDP is projected to be 4 percent over the Plan's period, with a 
planned growth of 15. 5 percent in industry, 9 percent in financial 
and business services, and 6 percent in agriculture. The Plan 
included no further expansion in government and negligible activ-
ity in large scale construction. 
The third theme emphasizes the goal of reducing the number on 
foreign nationals working in the Kingdom by 500,000. Some labor 
saving devices and techniques will be introduced to reduce the 
dependence on unskilled labor from abroad. The final-and possi-
29. Saudi Report, (April 1, 1985), p. 4. 
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bly the most important-thrust of the Plan is to promote the private 
sector's role in the development of the economy. The Plan envi-
sions a much more active role by the private sector in industries 
currently financed or administered by the government. As an incen-
tive, the government has proposed that financial resources and 
facili~ies will be available to prospective investors. Other incentives 
to stimulate investment in domestic production and to promote 
local growth will be implemented in the hope that capital is created 
which can then be reinvested within Saudi Arabia. 
Conclusions 
Given the same caveats outlined with respect to the macro impli-
cations of the Third Plan, it is clear that Saudi Arabia planning has 
. evolved into an advanced stage and that the country is on a path to 
economic modernization. As the Fourth Plan states, the Saudi econ-
omy is " ... emerging from a construction based economy into a 
more solid production based growth economy." The massive and 
unprecedented investments in infrastructure development ". . . 
have just started to pay off. Their impact on growth of the economy 
has just begun to unfold and the future gains from such investments 
should be the hallmark of the Saudi economy in the years to come." 
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